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I(olender v. Lawson
Kolender v. Lawson, 33 CrL 3063 -
@* qU!, trevjsjted.
Poljce officers were recentlY
confronted by newspaper reports which
seemed to say that the Unjted States
Supreme Court had prohibited police
officers from ask'ing a person to identi-fy himse'lf . These accounts gave the
impression that another too:l of po'l'ice
work had been taken from the hands of
the people whose duty it was to protect
society. Because of the confusion
surrounding this issue, d look at thjs
decision in order to determine what 'it
means (and what jt doesn't) would be
hel pful .
The case in point jn Kolender v.
Lawson, No. 8l-- 1320, dec'ided May 2 ,
1983 before the United States Supreme
Court (lt crt 3063). This case came to
the court as a challenge to a Caljfornia
statute which required persons who
loitered or wandered on the streets to
provide "credible and reliable" ident'i-fication and to account for their
presence when requested to do so by a
police officer. In a 7 - 2 decision,
the Supreme Court held that this parti-
cular statute was "unconstitutionall,v
vague within tltre meaning of the Due
Process cl ause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by failing to clarify what is
contemplated by the requirement that a
suspect prov'idd a 'credible and reliable'
i denti fi cati on r " Kol ender v . Lawson 
'3063.
The court is very concerned with
the words "credi bl e and rel 'iabl e" .
Ihe interpretation of this phrase by
an officer
confers on police a
vi rtual'ly unrestrai ned
power to arrest and charge
persons with a violation.
Id,3068.
Because the stoP-and-identifY
nature of the statute is mod'ified by
the judgment of the officer as to the
degree and character of identification
necessary rather than specific identi-
fication requirements, the court fo'und
the statute to be unconstitutionally
vague.
In an effort to better disseminate
information on legal matters that
affect law enforcement officers, we
are p'leased to present to You the
LEGAL LOG.
This publication is made available
to you on a regular basis.
Your cormnents and suggestions for
future issues are solicited. Corres-
pondence should be addressed to Lega'l
Log, 5400 Broad River Road, Columbia'
s.c. 29210
Henry Ray Wengrow
General Counsel
In a concurrent opinion, Justjce
Brennan adds language whjch ind'icates
that even if the vagueness were cleared
up, the statute would not be constitu-
tional under the Fourth Amendment. While
the op'injon of Justice Brennan does not
have the force of law, jt does remind
us that the law of TerrX v. Oh'io, 392
U.S. 1, (1968) js stiTf-the T-awof the
I and.
In Terry, the Supreme Court recog-
nized and limited the stop-and-frisk
procedure.
In order to justify a "stop", the
offi cers
must be able to point to
specific and articulable
facts, which, taken together
with logicaf inferences,
from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion.
Terry, supra at 27.
In addition, there is a
narrowly drawn authority
to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the
protection of the police
officer, where he has reason
to bel i eve that he i s deal'inq
r.vi th an armed and dangerous
i ndi vi dual . . . " Terry, supra ,
at 31.
This is the right to "frisk" or to pat
down a subiect's outer clothing to
determine if weapons are oresent. Addi
tional procedures are pointed out jn
Kol ender.
Terry encounters must bebrief; the susPect must
not be moved or asked to
move more than a short
distance; physical searches
are permitted only to the
extent necessary to protect
suspect must be free to
and to decl i ne. to a
Kolender v. Lawson. supra
3G6-,-lempnas-iF added ) .
Nothing in either Kolender or
Terry would prohibit an-oTTJcer orjndeed a private cjtizen from approach-
ing anyone and requesting identification.
However, the subject does not have to
respond, or even to remain where he is,
and if he does not, then the officer
must meet Terry standards to detain
the subjecTE6n for a short DefinA
of time. While a subject may be askedquestions concerning identificat'ion,
the subject has no duty to respond.
The law is clearly stated in Terry arrd
quoted in Kolender:
the police officers involved
during the encounter; and
most importantly, the
0f course, the person
stopped is not obliged
to answer, answers may
not be compel I ed, and
refusal to answer furnishes
no basis for arrest, dl-
though it may alert the
officer to the need for
continued observations.
Terry, supra, at 34 (White
concurri ng ) .
An officer may stil'l ask for iden-
tifjcation from a subject. However, if
no identjfication is forthcoming or if
the subject merely walks off, nofurther action can be taken without
additional facts that raise the encount-
er to a stop-and-frisk or an arrest
si tuati on.
LEGAL LOG devotes its columns to law
enforcement's 1 egal probl ems. An
attempt is made to offer practical
. 
guidelines to law enforcement officers
rather than abstract leqal theories.
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